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MAGNA CARTA’S AMERICAN ADVENTURE* 
A. E. DICK HOWARD** 
I spent a good part of the summer of 2015 in England, lecturing 
on aspects of Magna Carta. It seemed that every town, village, or 
crossroads with any connection to Magna Carta was celebrating the 
Charter’s eight hundredth anniversary. It’s not surprising to hear 
about celebrations in the country that gave birth to Magna Carta. But 
the question I want to put before you tonight is: why should 
Americans care? After all, Magna Carta’s origins were a long time 
ago, in a very distant place, born of a struggle between King John and 
the barons. Why would an American remember Magna Carta? 
When I was very small, one of the authors whose books I came to 
love was A. A. Milne. You Winnie the Pooh buffs will know about 
Milne. Perhaps you know Milne’s Now We Are Six. One of the poems 
in the collection is “King John’s Christmas.” It begins,  
King John was not a good man— 
He had his little ways. 
And sometimes no one spoke to him 
For days and days and days.1 
For a little kid, the idea of being shunned—that nobody will speak to 
you—is really terrible. How could you be so awful that people won’t 
even talk to you? 
Well, I grew up and read some more about King John. I 
discovered that he was that bad—maybe worse. Not only was he bad 
in moral terms, he was also a bad king. John managed to make 
enemies throughout the realm and beyond. He quarreled with Pope 
Innocent III over the election of an Archbishop of Canterbury to the 
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point where the Pope put England under an interdict, suspending 
church services and sacraments. He quarreled with the townspeople 
of London. His military adventures abroad were total failures. 
Defeated at the Battle of Bouvines in 1214, he ultimately lost most of 
the Normans’ landholdings in Normandy. 
The barons had particular cause to be unhappy with King John. 
He imposed harsh demands for revenue on the barons in ways that 
were clearly not acceptable to them. At length, all these 
misadventures piled up on King John, resulting in the meeting at 
Runnymede on the fifteenth of June, 1215. King John was, to be sure, 
a totally unwilling and reluctant bargainer who didn’t want to be 
there. But the result was the document whose eight hundredth 
anniversary we are celebrating. 
King John never meant to keep the promises he made in Magna 
Carta. Indeed, having made up with the Pope, John persuaded him to 
annul Magna Carta several weeks after its making. The Pope said this 
was a bargain made under duress, and contracts made under duress 
are not legal. That could have been the end of the story. If so, we 
wouldn’t be here this weekend, and I certainly wouldn’t be at this 
lectern. 
What happened then, however, was that King John died the next 
year, 1216. One of the chroniclers said that King John died of a surfeit 
of peaches and new cider. I was very relieved to see that the menu 
tonight did not include peaches and new cider. His successor, Henry 
III, was nine years old. This was the Middle Ages. How long might a 
nine-year-old king live? You could imagine the knives being 
sharpened. You’ve seen Game of Thrones; you know what it was like. 
So John’s regent, William Marshal, hit on what our age might call a 
public relations gesture. He decided that Magna Carta should be 
reissued by way of affirming the new king’s good faith with the people 
of England. Thus began the tradition over the years of each 
successive monarch’s reissuing Magna Carta. 
Like so much of the common law, Magna Carta evolved. It 
changed, some provisions were removed, but it remained very much 
part of the fabric of English law until, in 1297, it went on the statute 
books of England. In 1368, a law was enacted declaring that if any 
statute were inconsistent with Magna Carta, that statute would be null 
and void. One asks: how could one statute say that another one was 
superior? It may have been a canon of construction—that if a judge 
had a case and Magna Carta was in tension with another statute, the 
judge should prefer Magna Carta. However one reads that enactment, 
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it reflects the emerging notion that Magna Carta was not just any 
statute, it was superior to ordinary law. 
I’ll pass over the Tudor period. You’ve probably watched Wolf 
Hall. We don’t remember the reign of Henry VIII as being a great 
period of constitutional government. I will, however, touch briefly on 
the seventeenth century before turning to the story here in America. 
The century began with James VI of Scotland coming to the English 
throne as James I. The Stuarts invoked the divine right of kings, 
putting them on a collision course with Parliament. That turbulent 
century saw the English Petition of Right, the execution of Charles I, 
the Cromwellian Commonwealth, and the restoration of the Stuarts. 
In 1688, the Glorious Revolution brought William and Mary to the 
throne, followed swiftly by the enactment of the English Bill of Rights 
in 1689. By the end of the seventeenth century, the shape of 
constitutional government in England was profoundly different from 
what it had been at the beginning of the century. 
Before I leave the English story, I must mention Sir Edward 
Coke. A commentator on Magna Carta, Coke was a leader of the 
parliamentary forces opposing the pretentions of the Stuart kings. In 
the great debate leading up to the Petition of Right (1628), Coke said, 
“Magna Carta is such a fellow that he will have no sovereign.” 
That, in succinct form, is the English side of the story. What 
about America? How did Magna Carta get here, and why does it 
matter? 
Let me begin with the Virginia Company Charter of 1606 and the 
colony at Jamestown. The Virginia Company was a commercial 
enterprise. It was a stock company—you bought shares and hoped to 
make money. But, commercial gain aside, there was one provision in 
the company’s charter that is especially pertinent to our story. There 
was a guarantee that the emigrants to Virginia would enjoy the 
privileges, franchises, and immunities they would have enjoyed in 
England. Which is to say, you pull up roots in England, you go to this 
wilderness called Virginia, you don’t leave your rights behind. 
One may fairly debate what the framers of that language 
meant—what precisely were the “liberties, franchises and 
immunities” might elude definition. In any event, the colonists and 
their descendants took that language seriously. They understood that 
the corpus of English common law came with them and protected 
them in America. 
The charters of the other English-speaking colonies had language 
like that I just quoted from the Charter of 1606. There were yet other 
ways that English law was being implanted in the colonies. Colonial 
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assemblies were instructed that their laws must be consistent with the 
laws of England. There were provisions requiring the transmission of 
American ordinances back to London to be approved. Given the time 
transmittal took in those days, it’s not clear how effective the 
requirement was. Even so, the formal requirement was there. 
As you can well imagine, notions of inherited rights evolved over 
time. When Americans began to evoke Magna Carta in the 
eighteenth century, claims were being made that, in the thirteenth 
century, John and the barons would not have recognized. A fair 
amount of mythologizing went on, but that’s how constitutional ideas 
take form over the years. 
On the eve of Revolution, consider the uses the colonists were 
making of Magna Carta and what they understood to be its 
protections against even acts of Parliament. In 1761 in Boston, James 
Otis made the famous argument against writs of assistance. You 
students of the Fourth Amendment will recognize that argument as 
having planted the seed of the Fourth Amendment. Otis represented 
Boston merchants who objected to writs of assistance, which allowed 
customs officials to enter homes or places of business and search for 
anything they liked. In his argument, Otis relied directly on Magna 
Carta and on Sir Edward Coke. 
In Dr. Bonham’s Case (1610), Coke said that acts of Parliament 
against “Common Right and Reason” were void. That was not a 
proposition that Britain’s government in the 1760s would have 
accepted or understood. William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the 
Laws of England declared Parliament sovereign. Parliament calls the 
shots. Whatever Parliament says is law. So there you have it—on one 
side of the Atlantic, Blackstone’s jurisprudence, and, on the 
American side, Otis and others citing Coke’s. Two totally different 
concepts of the constitution. Otis’s argument in 1761 was, in our 
modern sense, a constitutional argument. He was saying that there 
are certain things the British Parliament can’t do. The British and the 
Americans were talking past each other at this point. Small wonder 
that, in London, they said, “What are these Americans talking 
about?” 
Then came the Stamp Act of 1765. This was the first time that 
Parliament had sought to impose an internal tax on Americans; up to 
that point, taxes had been external, such as customs dues. The Stamp 
Act produced an outpouring of resentment in the colonies. The cry 
was heard, “No taxation without representation.” What followed is 
familiar history—the Boston Tea Party, the closure of the port of 
Boston, the quartering of British troops in Boston, and the dissolution 
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of the colonial assembly. Americans called these measures the 
“coercive” or “intolerable” acts; the other colonies came to the 
support of Massachusetts. In 1774, the Continental Congress passed 
resolutions, quoting from the early colonial charters—the promise of 
privileges, franchises, and immunities—and reminding the British that 
these rights descended down through the generations from the 
original colonists. 
One thing I find interesting about those resolutions of 1774 was 
the debate over what sources Americans should point to as the bases 
for these American rights. Some delegates, for example, John 
Dickinson, said we should base our rights on natural law—inherent 
rights. Today we might call them “human rights.” Other delegates, 
being more legalistic, said, “No, better we cite the colonial charters.” 
Yet others said, “We should rest our claims of rights on the British 
constitution, in particular, on Magna Carta.” The delegates resolved 
the debate by sweeping all those sources into their resolutions, rather 
than choosing among them. Reading the resolutions of 1774, one 
finds eclecticism at play. Natural law, the word of God, the British 
constitution, Magna Carta, the colonial charters—here are our rights. 
The delegates were, in effect, saying, “Put what label you like on it, 
call it natural law or Magna Carta or whatever, but it all adds up to 
the same thing—we Americans have rights, and you British are not 
respecting those rights.” 
So it was on the eve of Revolution. Then we pass to the making 
of the first state constitutions. The revolutionary convention that met 
in Williamsburg in May of 1776 instructed Virginia’s delegates in 
Philadelphia to introduce the resolution for independence. On the 
same day, they set to work on Virginia’s first state constitution. It was 
intuitive to those Virginians that, if you resolve to be independent, 
the first thing you do is write a constitution. 
Actually, the Virginia convention set to work not on one 
document but on two. The members settled on George Mason’s 
famous Declaration of Rights for Virginia. Then they set to work on a 
second document, a frame of government. We are seeing John 
Locke’s notion of the social compact in action. First, you set down 
your inherent rights—they precede government, they don’t depend 
on government. Then you write a constitution. Today, you will find 
the Declaration of Rights as Article I in the Constitution of Virginia. 
It’s easy to overlook the fact that Article I began as an independent 
and distinctive document. 
One of the people who didn’t like that first Virginia constitution 
was the founder of my university, Thomas Jefferson. I have to admit, 
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by the way, that it’s written into my contract at UVA that I’m not 
allowed to make any public talk or lecture without somewhere citing 
Thomas Jefferson. So I want you to note that this is my obligatory 
mention of Jefferson. He spent the next fifty years condemning the 
first Virginia constitution for many reasons, among them, the limited 
franchise and unfair apportionment. But his most basic complaint was 
that the constitution was made by a body of men who were also 
passing ordinary laws for Virginia, confusing constitution-making 
with lawmaking. If that body could make laws and constitutions, then 
it could unmake them. The constitution is simply another law. 
Here, I must give credit to Massachusetts for doing what we in 
Virginia did not. By the way, I was in Boston last fall at Faneuil Hall, 
giving the James Otis lecture. I told friends in Massachusetts that they 
are wonderful with words, but they’re not so good at numbers. They 
don’t quite understand that 1607 is a lower number than 1620. That 
probably didn’t make me very popular in Boston. But I did tell them 
that their ancestors made history when they adopted Massachusetts’s 
first constitution in 1780. It was written by a convention elected for 
the express purpose of writing a constitution, and it was then voted on 
by the people in a referendum. What Jefferson complained that 
Virginia had not done, Massachusetts did. 
Thus, Americans had invented the constitutional convention. 
This was something that the Europeans had not contrived. Americans 
were responding to the question, “How do you make the constitution 
secure from and superior to ordinary law?” The Massachusetts 
Constitution blends American ideas about sovereignty with English 
ideas drawn from Magna Carta and British constitutionalism, for 
example, provisions, replicating, almost word for word, chapters 39 
and 40 of the 1215 Charter. 
What of the great Philadelphia Convention of 1787? We have no 
full transcript of the convention’s debates. (We do have Madison’s 
notes.) As far as I know, Magna Carta was never mentioned at the 
convention. There’s certainly no record of it. Assuming that’s true, 
isn’t that startling in light of the story I have been telling? If 
Americans cared so much about Magna Carta—if they relied on it so 
firmly in the run-up to the Revolution—why didn’t they talk about it 
in Philadelphia? 
If I could pose this question to the Federalists, they would 
probably say that Magna Carta was a gift from the king, whereas the 
Constitution is ordained by “We the People.” And they might add 
that Magna Carta bound royal power, whereas they were writing a 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1413 (2016) 
2016] MAGNA CARTA'S AMERICAN ADVENTURE 1419 
constitution binding all of the branches of government—executive, 
legislative, and judicial. 
A nearly fatal mistake was made at Philadelphia—the omission 
of a bill of rights. This was part of the British tradition that got 
neglected. Elbridge Gerry, of Massachusetts, and Virginia’s George 
Mason wanted a bill of rights, but the convention rejected that 
proposal. Some delegates thought a bill of rights was not necessary to 
bind a government of delegated powers. Maybe they were tired; it 
was one of those hot, muggy summers in Philadelphia. In any event, 
in rejecting a bill of rights, they handed the so-called “Anti-
Federalists” a signal argument. Opponents of the proposed 
Constitution could say, “Look at these people! They’re not providing 
for our rights, this new Constitution doesn’t talk about rights!” 
During the ratifying contest, Madison said, “Ok, we get the point. Just 
ratify the Constitution, and then, at the first Congress, we will 
propose amendments to create a bill of rights.” As you know, that’s 
what they did. We got the first ten amendments to the Constitution. 
The story of these events in America is a blend of innovation and 
tradition. Federalism, judicial review, checks and balances—these are 
very American. Tradition embraces the legacy of Magna Carta, the 
Petition of Rights, the English Bill of Rights, the common law—all 
blended together in the American state and federal constitutions. 
What is the legacy of Magna Carta in American 
constitutionalism? I would suggest the following. First, Magna Carta 
is the iconic way of talking about the rule of law, not only in America 
and England, but around the globe. We lawyers use the phrase “rule 
of law” as if it were somehow self-revealing. I remember being in 
Leningrad, now St. Petersburg, consulting with drafters at work on 
Russia’s first post-Soviet constitution. (Those were the days when we 
thought that Russia was going to join the family of liberal democratic 
constitutional regimes. Now it seems like a long time ago.) I don’t 
speak Russian. In Leningrad, we were working through a very good 
translator. I discovered at one point that she was translating the 
English phrase “rule of law” as “socialist legality.” I had to say, “Well, 
no, that’s not exactly what we mean when we talk about ‘rule of 
law.’ ” So, you see, the notion of “rule of law” is not quite self-
evident. 
Magna Carta’s second legacy is the articulation of fundamental 
rights. We Americans are intensely rights-conscious. Constitutions 
around the world talk about rights, but in America in particular we 
have internalized the idea. We turn garden-variety disputes into 
lawsuits and those lawsuits into constitutional claims. I sometimes 
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think that our national motto should be something like, “I’ll see you 
in court.” We complain about courts, but when we think our rights 
are being violated we are the first ones to go to court. 
Thirdly, there is the idea of a written constitution. Magna Carta, 
the Petition of Rights, the Bill of Rights, the Constitution—all are 
examples of putting it in writing. In America, that tradition may be 
reinforced by the strong religious impulse that brought so many 
settlers here, carrying with them the notion of The Book. 
Fourthly—here we’re getting to the nub of the matter—Magna 
Carta has a lot to do with putting us on the road to constitutional 
supremacy. This entails the notion of a constitution that is a super-
statute and not ordinary law. Recall James Otis’s arguments in 
Boston—the constitutional claim that even Parliament’s powers were 
limited. Already, we were on the road to the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution—the Constitution and all laws “made in 
pursuance thereof” shall be “the supreme law of the land.” 
People often treat John Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. 
Madison (1803) as if it had sprung from the brow of Zeus. In fact, 
judicial review was an idea fully formed by the time of Marbury. For 
law students here, do you remember the first time you read Marbury? 
I’m tempted to cold-call some people at that table over there. Give 
me the facts and holding in Marbury. But this is a social occasion; I’m 
not going to do that to my young friends here. But, do you remember 
the first time you read Marbury? Were you struck by the fact that 
Marshall begins with general principles of jurisprudence? Then he 
goes on as if it’s obvious; you write a constitution, of course it’s 
supreme! What do you expect? Then, fairly late in the opinion, he 
reminds you of the language of the Supremacy Clause. Marshall saw 
his reasoning as basic: This is all about constitutions. If you write one, 
of course the court has to treat it as being fundamental law. 
Finally, summing up Magna Carta’s legacy, I think that the 
tradition of organic, unfolding, evolving constitutional law flows from 
Magna Carta. Mr. Dean, Justice Scalia is not here tonight. If he were, 
I suspect I would be inviting an argument. I refer, of course, to what 
we call the “living Constitution.” One may object to the notion of the 
“living Constitution,” but that’s what we have.2 Think about Eighth 
Amendment cases on cruel and unusual punishment. Today, the 
 
 2. Justice Scalia died after this talk was given. He was a friend (a former colleague 
on the University of Virginia’s law faculty). I respected him for his bold contributions to 
constitutional dialogue. I will miss his distinctive voice, and readers of the U.S. Reports 
will find those pages less lively. 
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Eighth Amendment is not read as forbidding only those practices that 
were banned in 1791. The Supreme Court continues to see the 
concept of cruel and unusual punishment as evolving. I think, for 
example, of two 1989 cases upholding the death penalty for the 
somewhat mentally retarded and for youthful offenders. Within 
twenty years, the Supreme Court had overruled both of those 
precedents. 
Even more pertinent to the Magna Carta story is the use, over 
the years, of due process of law. The requirement, in chapter 39 of the 
1215 charter, that procedures be in accordance with the “law of the 
land” evolved into what we call today “due process of law.” When 
you think about the history of the Due Process Clause and the ways in 
which it has been used over the years, you see the essence of the 
living Constitution. Let me quote from Justice Kennedy in Lawrence 
v. Texas (2003), the case in which the Court struck down Texas’s 
antisodomy law. Kennedy said that those who drew and ratified the 
Due Process Clause “did not presume” to know 
the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities . . . . 
They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later 
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and 
proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution 
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in 
their own search for greater freedom.3 
Consider, then, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell 
v. Hodges (2015), the same-sex marriage case. Near the end of that 
opinion, one finds, almost word-for-word, the language I just quoted 
from 2003. Justice Kennedy didn’t think it necessary to put the 
language in quotation marks or to refer back to his own opinion in 
Lawrence. He simply said it as if it had now become an accepted part 
of the corpus, of the fabric, of American constitutional law. There you 
have a current reminder of the power of the ideas that flow all the 
way back to Magna Carta. 
What about Magna Carta, the document itself? There are 
seventeen extant copies of the Charter, from the four that survive 
from 1215, through the year 1297, when the Charter went on the 
statute books of England. Some years ago I was flying to London. My 
seatmate was a lawyer from Texas. He was Ross Perot’s personal 
lawyer. He told me the story of how Perot, a man of some means, 
decided he would like to have a copy of Magna Carta. He had heard 
 
 3. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003). 
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that there was a family in England who owned a copy of the 1297 
charter. So, he sent this lawyer over to England to bargain for and to 
purchase that copy. He paid $1.5 million. This was back in the 1980s, 
so the price was, for most of us, not pocket change. 
After some years had passed, Ross Perot decided he didn’t need 
this copy of Magna Carta anymore. So he put it on auction at 
Sotheby’s in New York. Another man of some means, David 
Rubenstein, a philanthropist who has been very generous to 
Montpelier and Monticello and other places, heard about the auction. 
For this copy of Magna Carta, he bid $21.5 million. I then had a call 
from the National Archives. They were going to put this copy of 
Magna Carta on display; they asked if I would come up and give a 
lecture. I said, “Sure, I’d be happy to do that.” Well, from time to 
time, the Washington Post has a little box mentioning three or four 
things in the next week that you might find interesting. The week 
before my lecture at the Archives, the box said something like, 
“Professor A. E. Dick Howard, of the University of Virginia, on 
Tuesday, March 10, at 7:30 p.m., will be at the National Archives to 
talk about his book, The Road from Runnymede, and his purchase of 
Magna Carta for $21.5 million.” That evening, I went home to my 
wife, Mary, and I said, “Mary, we’re going to start getting some very 
interesting phone calls—invitations to some very fancy dinners and 
parties. They will think, ‘If Professor Howard can pay that kind of 
money for Magna Carta, there’s a lot more where that came from.’ ” 
I said, “Don’t ask any questions, just say ‘yes’ and accept those 
invitations.” 
So there you have Magna Carta in America. We don’t live in 
feudal times. I don’t think even the worst of our public officials can 
match King John. We’re not worried about the pretentions of 
monarchs. But we are pursuing in our day and time our own quest for 
ordered liberty, a quest that invokes values and aspirations that lie at 
the heart of Magna Carta’s legacy. I salute the law school here at the 
University of North Carolina for hosting some very distinguished 
people for this symposium. I commend the Law Review for making 
the symposium possible and for publishing its deliberations. And I 
thank all of you so much for your characteristic Carolina hospitality.* 
 
 * The descendants of the barons of Runnymede confirm their gratitude. I have been 
unable to reach anyone to speak for King John. 
